Social Norms

The rules that a group uses for appropriate and inappropriate values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviors. Failure to stick to the rules can result in severe punishments, the most feared of which is exclusion from the group. A common rule is that the some norms must frequently be displayed; neutrality is seldom an option.

Rational action is concerned with outcomes. Rationality says: If you want to achieve Y, do X. By contrast, Social norms by the feature that they are not outcome-oriented. The simplest social norms are of the type: Do X, or: Don't do X. More complex norms say: If you do Y, then do X, or: If others do Y, then do X. More complex norms still might say: Do X if it would be good if everyone did X. Rationality is essentially conditional and future-oriented. Social norms are either unconditional or, if conditional, are not future-oriented. For norms to be social, they must be shared by other people and partly sustained by their approval and disapproval. They are also sustained by the feelings of embarrassment, anxiety, guilt and shame that a person suffers at the prospect of violating them. A person obeying a norm may also be propelled by positive emotions, like anger and indignation.

Social norms must be distinguished from a number of other, related phenomena. First, social norms differ from moral norms. Some moral norms, like those derived from utilitarian ethics, are consequentialist. Secondly, social norms differ from legal norms. Legal norms are enforced by specialists who do so out of self-interest: they will lose their job if they don't. By contrast, social norms are enforced by members of the general community, and not always out of self-interest (see below). Thirdly, social norms are more than the convention equilibria. The evolution of a convention equilibrium is guided by whether the conventions lead to a substantively better outcome, however, that many social norms do not benefit anyone. Fourthly, social norms differ from private norms, the self-imposed rules that people construct to overcome weakness of will (Ainslie 1982, 1984, 1986). Private norms, like social norms, are non-outcome-oriented and sustained by feelings of anxiety and guilt. They are not, however, sustained by the approval and disapproval of others since they are not, or not necessarily, shared with others. Finally, norm-guided behavior must be distinguished from habits and compulsive neuroses. Unlike social norms, habits are private. Unlike private norms, their violation does not generate self-blame or guilt. Unlike neuroses and private norms, habits are not compulsive. Unlike social norms, compulsive neuroses are highly idiosyncratic. Yet what in one culture looks like a compulsive neurosis may, in another society, be an established social norm .Compulsive revenge behavior could be an example to fix our ideas, examples of social norms.

Consumption norms regulate manners of dress, manners of table and the like. Pierre Bourdieu (1979) has extended the notion of consumption norms to cover cultural behavior: which movies do you see? which books do you read? which sports do you practice? what kind of furniture do you buy?

Norms against behavior "contrary to nature " include rules against incest, cannibalism, homosexuality and sodomy.

Norms regulating the use of money often become legal, like the law against buying and selling votes.

Norms of reciprocity enjoins us to return favous done to us by others (Gouldner, 1960). Gift-giving is often regulated by these norms. There may not be an unconditional norm of giving Christmas presents to a first cousin, but once the cousin begins to give me a gift I am under an obligation to return it.

Norms of retribution enjoin us to return harm done to us by others. Rules regulating revenge are often highly elaborate (Hasluck, 1954; Boehm, 1984; Miller, forthcoming). Nevertheless, revenge often seems to be contrary to self-interest. "Who sees not that vengeance, from the force alone of passion, may be so eagerly pursued as to make us knowingly neglect every consideration of ease, interest, or safety?"

Work norms. The workplace is a hotbed for norm-guided action. There is a social norm against living off other people and a corresponding normative pressure to earn one's income from work (Elster, 1988).

Norms of cooperation. There are many outcome-oriented maxims of cooperation. A utilitarian, for instance, would cooperate if and only if his contribution increases the average utility of the members in the group. There are also, however, non-outcome-oriented norms of cooperation. One is what one may call "everyday Kantianism:" cooperate if and only if it would be better for all if all cooperated than if nobody did. Another is a "norm of fairness:" cooperate if and only if most other people cooperate. Among the phenomena based on norms of cooperation one may cite voting (Barry, 1979) and tax compliance (Laurin, 1986).

Norms of distribution regulate what is seen as a fair allocation of income or other goods. In democratic societies, the norm of equality is especially strong. As Tocqueville ( 1969, p. 505 ) wrote: "the passion for equality seeps into every corner of the human heart, expands and fills the whole. It is no use telling them that by this blind surrender to an exclusive passion they are compromising their dearest interests; they are deaf." People may be willing to take a loss rather than accept a distribution they find unfair.

To accept social norms as a motivational mechanism is not to deny the importance of rational choice. One eclectic view is that some actions are rational, others are norm-guided. A more general and more adequate formulation would be that actions typically are influenced both by rationaliy and by norm. Sometimes, the outcome is a compromise between what the norm prescribes and what rationality dictates. The subjects in the experiment of Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) who rejected very unfair distributions, preferring to take nothing rather than to be exploited by others, did accept mildly skewed distributions. At other times, rationality acts as a constraint on social norms. Many people vote out of civic duty, except when the costs become very high. Conversely, social norm can act as a constraint on rationality. Cutthroat competitiveness in the market can go together with strict adherence to norm of honesty (Coleman, 1982).